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Appellant Simons replies to the Brief of PlaintiffRespondent Bonneville Properties, Incorporated ("Bonneville"
herein) as follows:
REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS
It is axiomatic that the facts on appeal are those
facts stipulated by the parties or determined by the trial
court, if supported by the evidence.

This Court should, there-

fore, be aware that the facts recited in the Brief of Appellant
were a substantial restatement of the comprehensive stipulation
entered at the time of trial.

(See Tr. 3-19)

By contrast,

numerous statements advanced by Appellee as "facts" are con-trary to the stipulated facts,

~ithout

support in the findings

of the trial judge and contrary to the evidence.
There is no finding, for example, that Bonneville
"relied" on Simons' published commission.

(Br. 1)

The asser-

tion that Bonneville "introducted the-ultimate buyer of the
warehouse to Simons"

(Br. 1, 2) is contrary to the stipulated

facts, the uncontroverted evidence and the findings of the
trial court.*

* The stipulated fact is that Bonneville's agent met with a
representative of Jelco, Inc. (not A.K. Utah) with regard to the
possibility that the Fashion Fabrics property might be used to
perform the Swaner exchange agreement.
(Tr. 9)
Mr. Emanual A.
Floor testified that Jelco had no authority to represent A.K.
Utah.
(Tr. 231-233)
The trial court found that Bonneville
introduced the "name" of A.K. Utah, but that "neither plaintiff
nor its agents, L. Richard Sorensen and Dennis Christensen,
represented A.K. Utah as realtors at any time."
(Finding of
Fact No. 11)
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Bonneville would further divert the Court with argument of spurious issues to this litigation.

There was no issue

at trial over whether Bonneville "agreed" to any change in the
commission split (Br. 1) , a.nd could not be in a claim based
upon a unilateral contract.

The facts, had they been the facts,

that its principals and agents "met with Simons"
quested to be in

at~endance

at all negotiations"

(Br. 6) "re(Br. 7), "were

ready and willing at all times to offer assistance"

(Br. 8), or

that "attorneys for A.K. Utah" had "expressed an intent to purchase"

(Br. 7) are of no consequence in this case involving

performance of such a contract.
The proper, and we submit, dispositive issue is that
admitted at Br. 7:
on the e£fective date of [Simons' change of commission split] no written agreements had been
reached • • . regarding the sale of the subject
property and an exchange which was to take place
thereafter.
(emphasis added)
Appellees do a disservice to this Court by introducing such
spurious issues.
POINT I
THIS COURT HAS NEVER ADOPTED THE
MINORITY POSITION CONCERNING ACCEPTANCE
OF OFFERS OF UNILATERAL CONTRACTS
Bonneville candidly admits at Br. 10 that the decision
below can be affirmed only if the position of RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 45 is the law in Utah.

That position is that an offer

of a unilateral contract implies a promise not to revoke the
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offer to one who has undertaken "substantial performance."
The majority of jurisdictions, including Utah, do not
follow the section relied upon.

They adhere, instead, to the

standards of RESTATEMENT 2d, AGENCY § 447, requiring performance of all essential terms of the offer, at least in the absence of bad faith.

Bonneville thus advances a minority posi-

tion on unilateral contracts, never adopted in the State of
Utah and which, we submit, should not be adopted in this case.
A.

Reliance

~the

Auerbach's

Auerbach's,

Inc.~

~is

Misplaced.

Kimball, 572 P.2d 376 {Utah 1977),

despite the urging at Br. 10-11, does not adopt the minority
position of RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 45, either in specific
terms or by reasonable inference.

Neither does it reject the

well established law in this jurisdiction respecting real estate
brokerage contracts of,
554, 137 P2d 342 (1943).

~'

E.B. Wicks Co.

~Moyle,

103 Utah

That law is the majority position of

RESTATEMENT 2d, AGENCY § 447.

In fact, the Auerbach's case

does not even deal with the specialized problem of unilateral
agreements of subagency in the real estate business.
The Auerbach's case merely held that an employee
which had completed thirty-eight years of service, on a promise
of a pension after thirty years service and the attainment of
sixty-five years of age, could pursue a claim in quasi contract.
A summary judgment dismissing the claim was accordingly reversed.
Auerbach's case addresses none of the issues herein.
The question of whether an offer of subagency is "fairly and in
-3-
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good faith terminated"

(~Wicks,

supra at 137 P.2d 345) might

be an issue on different facts, but in this case even that question was stipulated out of the case.

It was stipulated that

Simons in fact believed that he was entitled to a 60% commission
split (Tr. 11), as per the revised offer of subagency, and the
trial court found it to be a fact that "Simons in changing his
commission split

. did so in good faith."

(Finding of Fact No. 15)

(emphasis added)

Thus the "good faith" exception under

the majority rule, which Auerbach's may be read as addressing,
is simply not an issue herein, having been resolved against the
position of Bonneville.
The law of this State pertinent to Bonneville's claim
is that there is no right to a commission unless Bonneville had
produced a "written, binding offer" from a "ready, willing and
able buyer" agreeing to "all terms and conditions."
~

Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977).

Boyer Co.

Measured by that standard,

Bonneville in fact concedes that there can be no recovery with
the following admission at page 7 of its brief:
on the effective date of such change, no written
agreements had been reached . . • regarding the sale
of the subject property and an exchange which was to
take place thereafter.
B.

Bonneville's Claim Fails to Satisfy Even the
Auerbach's Dicta.
The language quoted by Bonneville from Auerbach's,

supra, is thus clear dicta, under any view.

More important,

even if it could be considered holding -- even if it could be

-4-
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taken as modifying the reasoned majority position of e.g.
_ Wicks, supra -- it is clear that Bonneville's claim must nevertheless fail.
That is so because the gist of the quoted dicta is
that "Kimball had performed a substantial part of the performance required in Auerbach's alleged offer."

Here there is no

finding that Bonneville substantially performed the task of
producing a written offer, by a ready, willing and able purchaser, on all of the terms specified in the offer.

To the

contrary, it is uncontroverted that Bonneville represented
~

and produced

~

offer, on those or any other terms.

tesimony of Mr. Emanuel A. Floor at Tr. 231-233)

~

(See

The trial

judge found it to be a fact "that neither plaintiff nor its
agents • . . represented A.K. Utah as realtors at any time."
(Finding of Fact no. 11)

Bonneville's claim is based on the

sole fact that it suggested the

~

of a potential buyer --

something far different than the "substantial performance" this
Court addressed in Auerbach's.
The trial judge never concluded that suggesting a
name amounted to "substantial performance," and indeed he could
not.

His conclusion, rather, is that "the introduction of the

purchaser's name was significant."
clusion of Law No. 5.

(emphasis added)

See Con-

That is a conclusion of no consequence

to the settled Utah law of ~' Wicks, supra.

It also falls

short of the "substantial performance" referred to in the
Auerbach's dicta.
-5-
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c.

Assertions of "Substantial Performance" were never
Adopted by the Trial Court and are not.Properly urged
Herein.
Bonneville's effort to argue that it "has substan-

tially performed," in the absence of any such finding by.the
trial court (see part B of Point I at Br. 12), amounts to a
confession of its untenable position.

Bonneville is thus re-

quired to depart from the findings of the trial court, the evidence herein, and the settled case law of this jurisdiction,
and urge matters beyond the evidence and the findings which it
is not the province of this Court to

determin~

on tbis appeal.

It is urged in that connection that one who "sells"
property is entitled to a commission (Br. 13), though it is a
stipulated fact, and determined by the trial judge, that Bonneville did not "sell" the property in question.
It is further urged that Bonneville "attempted to
involve itself in negotiations"

(Br. 15) and that "Simons pre-

cluded Bonneville from further performing in assisting or
otherwise negotiating with the respective parties."

(Br. 16)

The trial court made no such determinations and, to the contrary found as a fact that Bonneville represented no party to
the transaction.

Bonneville simply had no one to negotiate for

or involve itself with and in the nature of things Simons could
not "preclude" Bonneville from negotiating for clients it
never had.*

*

Bonnneville apparently refers to testimony to the effect
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The multiple cases cited in conjunction with that
discussion -- all from other jurisdictions -- thus lack relevance to the facts of this case and their reasoning is at odds
with the clear pronouncement of this Court that
A broker is never entitled to commissions for
unsuccessful efforts. The risk of a failure is
wholly his. The reward comes only with his success~
That is the plain contract and contemplation of the
parties. The broker may devote his time and labor,
and expend his money with ever so much devotion to
the interests of his employer, and yet if he fails,
if without effecting an agreement for accomplishing a
bargain, he abandons the effort, or his authority is
fairly and in good faith terminated, he gains no
right to commission. E.B. Wicks Co. v. Moyle, 103
Utah 554, 137 P.2d 342--rI"943).
~ ~
POINT II
APPELLEES FAIL TO EXPLAIN THE
PROCEDURAL ERRORS OF THE TRIAL COURT
Bonneville correctly states the law relative to amendment of pleadings and amendments to conform to the evidence.
(Br. 20-22}

It fails, however, to suggest any "prejudice" that

would result from deciding the cause, in the spirit of modern
procedure, on the facts adduced at trial rather than some technical error in plaintiff's answer authored by Simon's prior
(footnote continued}
that Dennis Christensen, Bonneville's agent, requested that
Simons allow him to sit in on negotiations so that he could
learn the complex and highly specialized commercial and industrial aspect of real estate. Simons replied, in substance, that
he did not "baby sit," even for his own agents. Such a refusal,
to one who had no client to negotiate for, was quite reasonable
and, does not "preclude" Bonneville from further negotiating,
had it been in a position to do so.

-7-
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counsel.
The absence of the poteQtial witness, Gary Jenkins,
from the state, or 'Bonneville's failure to depose him, cannot
justify the trial court's refusal to amend the pleadings to
reflect the fact that Jenkins never represented A.K. Utah.
That fact was clearly established by the evidence.

Granting

leave to amend could not amount to prejudice, for Simons agreed
to stipulate what Jenkins' testimony would be.
On the issues of standing under Utah Code Annotated
61-2-18 (1953), as amended (Br. 22-23) and custom and usage

§

(Br. 23-24), Bonneville correctly states the law, again, but
in that instance misstates the case.

The issue is not whether

Bonneville can function as a broker, but whether it or its
licensee, Mr. Sorenson, is the proper party to maintain an
action for a commission

and the legislature has determined

that he must.
In relation to custom and usage, the issue is not
whether Simons pleaded custom and usage, but whether it is
error to exclude evidence on that point in a claim asserted on
~

alleged agreement based upon custom and usage.

stipulation of the parties at Tr. 6)

(See the

In that regard the rules

of evidence dictate that Simons may adduce evidence pertinent
to matters placed in issue by Bonneville.
It is worthy of note, further, that when the issue
is "waiver" by reason of Dennis Christensen's settlement of
the same claim in Federal Court, Bonneville is forced to rely
-8-
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on the same bar of Utah Code Annotated§ 61-2-18 (1953), as
amended, that Simons invokes against it.
Bonneville cannot have it both ways.

(Br. 25-26)

Plainly,

Either the statute means

what it says and Bonneville is out of court, or it doesn't and
Christensen has already waived the claim.
As regards all three issues, Bonneville seeks to impose a rigidity reminiscent of the common law -- to evoke procedural booby traps which have not been condoned since the
advent of modern notice pleading.

The philosophy of modern

procedure is that causes should be resolved according to the
facts, rather than the snares a pleader may set or an unwary
litigant may fall into.

The error of the trial judge is that

he invoked procedures which prevented the true facts from being
shown, for no reasons which advanced the cause of justice.
Bonneville can prevail only if the errors in pleading are exhaul ted above the primary function of this and every court to
decide the issues according to the facts.
In truth, Bonneville may not prevail even if the errors
involved are thus exhalted.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the trial judge is supported by
neither the law nor the evidence.

Moreover, the findings of the

trial court are in and of themselves inconsistent with the decision, as is made evident by Bonneville's finding it necessary
to argue matters never determined below in an effort to justify
the result.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9-

For these reasons, and because of the multiple procedural errors explained in the Brief of Appellant, the decision
below should be reversed and this action dismissed.
Respectfully submitted this

'f

,-.-;...
/..,..........day of November,

1982.
PARKER M. NIELSON
MARY LOU GODBE

Byznry,4~
Attorneys for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

~

day of November,

1982, I hand-delivered two {2) true and correct copies of the
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Dennis K. Poole, POOLE,
CANNON & WARD, 4885 South 900 East, Suite 210, Salt Lake City,
Utah, attorneys for respondent.
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